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Cert to Ill App Ct (Heiple, 
Scott, Alloy) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY. May the police search a purse without a warrant 
after the owner has been arrested and transported to the station 
house? ---2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW. Police arrested resp for disturb-
ing the peace and took him to the station house. At the time of 
arrest, resp was wearing a purse over his shoulder. Police searched 
- 2 -
side a cigarette package. Resp was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance and moved to suppress the amphetamines. At the 
suppression hearing, the officer who searched the purse testified 
that he had no fear for his safety when he arrested resp and that he 
did not expect to find a gun or drugs when he searched the purse. 
Instead, he conducted the search because standard procedures require 
the police to inventory everything possessed by an arrestee. The 
officer admitted that resp's purse was small enough to be sealed in 
a bag or box for protective purposes. 
The trial court suppressed the evidence and the Ill App Ct af-
firmed. The State could not defend the search as a search incident 
to arrest, because it had not made this argument at the suppression 
hearing. Even if the State had not waived the point, a stationhouse 
search of a closed container cannot be a search incident to arrest. 
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977) (Government could 
not justify stationhouse search of locked footlocker, seized at time 
of arrest, as a search incident to arrest). 
The Ill Ct App then concluded that petr's search of the purse 
was not a valid inventory search. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
upheld the inventory search of an automo-
bile. Illinois, however, has refused to apply Opperman to closed 
personal containers, because these enjoy greater privacy interests 
than automobiles and because the police may secure containers of 
this sort simply by sealing them in a bag or box. People v. Bayles, 
82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980). In this case, moreover, the 
arresting officer testified that he had no fear for his safety. 
The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 
I 
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3. CONTENTIONS. (1) The search was a reasonable search inci-
dent to arrest. Chadwick is distinguishable because it involved a 
locked footlocker. The purse involved here was much more intimately 
associated with resp's person. As the Court recognized in United 
States v. Edwards, 415 u.s. 800, 803 (1974), "searches and seizures 
that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be 
conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention." 
Applying this principle, several courts have upheld stationhouse 
searches of wallets and purses. United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 
938 (CA9 1980); United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808 (CAS 1979); 
Sumlin v. State, 587 S.W.2d 571 (Ark. 1979). 
(2) The search was also a valid inventory search. As the Court 
recognized in Opperman, these searches protect the owner's property 
while it remains in police custody, protect the police against dis-
putes over lost and stolen property, and save the police from poten-
tial danger. Applying this reasoning, several courts have approved 
inventory searches of purses. E.g., People v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044 
(Cal. 1976) (dictum); People v. Harris, 105 Cal. App. 3d 204 (1st 
Dist. 1980); Sumlin v. State, supra. 
4. DISCUSSION. The Ill Ct App expressly referred to the 
Fourth Amendment and relied upon cases construing that provision. 
People v. Bayles, the Illinois case that the court followed, also 
rested explicitly on the Fourth Amendment. Thus, there is no doubt 
that the court invoked the federal Constitution to strike the search 
contested here. 
As petr points out, the lower court's holding conflicts with 
several other decisions. Even some of those conflicting decisions, 
- 4 -
moreover, expressed uncertainty about the effect of Chadwick on 
stationhouse searches. The Court, therefore, might want to call for 
a response and consider clarifying the bounds of stationhouse 
searches. 
On the other hand, this probably would be a poor case for that 
task. Although the lower court discussed the "search incident to 
arrest" exception at length, it rejected that rationale on the basis 
of the State's waiver. 1 This Court, accordingly, could only review 
the inventory search argument, which the state court rejected on the 
merits. It might be better to review the constitutionality of 
stationhouse searches in a case in which both the inventory and 
"search incident" rationales would be available to the Court. 
There is no response. 
May 18, 1982 Merritt op in petn 
1The court wrote: "we find the State has waived this argument 
for the purposes of appeal by failing to raise it at the 
suppression hearing ..•. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that 
the State has not waived this argument, the stationhouse search 
of the shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search incident to 
a lawful arrest." Petn app 3a. The court then discussed the 
merits of the State's argument, concluding: "we find the 
postponed warrantless search of the defendant's shoulder bag to 
be unreasonable" and "the search was not incident to the 
defendant's arrest." Id., at 4a, Sa. In light of the clear 
reference to the State'S waiver, I would interpret the latter 
conclusions as mere dictum. This does not appear to be a case in 
which the state court excused a default and rested its decision 
on the merits of the claim. 
J 
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AB SENT NOT YOTING 
October 28, 1982 
81-1859 Illinois v. LafavettB 
Dear Chief: 
Although my vote was a "shaky" one to join 3, I 
hesitate to decide this case by a PC. 
As I read your draft, it would expand our recent 
automobile search cases that were based - at least for me -
in part on the limited expectation of privacy that one has 
in an automobile. This was a part of the rationale in my 
Saunders opinion. 
The search of a closed container in a station 
house may, as vou suggest, be justified as an "inventory 
search", even though a warrant easily was obtainable. But I 
had rather not go this far without having full briefing and 
argument. Nor am I eaqer to add another Fourth Amendment 
case for this Term. I am now inclined to deny. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 







[Levene--October 28, 1982] 
2nd Draft -- Illinois v. Lafayette, No. 81-
1859 
Per Curiam: 
Respondent was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance in violation of Sec-
tion 1402 (b) of the Illinois Controlled Sub-
stances Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 56 1/2, ~ 
1402 (b). Prior to trial, the Kankakee County 
Circuit Court suppressed the ten amphetamine 
pills found in respondent's shoulder bag dur-- ~ ........................ 
ing an inventory se~ch at the stationhouse. 
The Iilinois Appellate Court affirmed the sup-
pression order, 99 Ill. App.3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 
1383 (3d Dist. 1981), and the Illinois Supreme 
Court declined discretionary review. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. B-1. We have concluded that 
- 2 -
the court below erred in requiring that re-
spondent's bag be sealed and inventoried as a 
single item, and we reverse. 
On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p.m., 
Officer Maurice Mietzner arrived at the Town 
Cinema in Kankakee in response to a call about 
~ 
a disturbance. There he found the respondent 
in a violent altercation with the theatre man-
ager. Mietzner arrested respondent for distur-
bance of the peace, handcuffed him, and took 
him to the police station. Respondent wore 
~ 
his shoulder bag on the trip to the station. 
At the police station respondent was 
taken to the booking room: there Mietzner re-
moved the handcuffs from respondent and or-
dered him to empty his pockets and place the 
contents on the counter. After doing so, re-
spondent took a package of cigarettes from his 
•. - 3 -
shoulder bag and placed the bag on the 
counter. Mietzner then searched the bag, and --
found ten amphetamine pills inside a cigarette 
case package. 
At the suppression hearing, Mietzner 
testified that he examined the bag's contents 
because "everything" had to be inventoried as 
"---'""' ---------
part of the standard police procedure. He did 
not expect to find drugs or weapons when he 
searched it; he conceded that the shoulder bag 
was small enough that it could have been 
"placed and sealed in a larger bag or box for 
-------------~ ~ 
protective purposes." 99 Ill. App.3d at 832, 
425 N.E.2d at 1384. 
The State argued before the trial court 
that the search of the shoulder bag was a val--
id inventory search. The trial court summari-
ly suppressed the pills. 
- 4 -
On appeal, the State contended for the 
first time that the search was "incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest," and again claimed 
that the search "constituted a valid inven-
torying of the defendant's personal effects 
upon his arrest." 99 Ill. App.3d at 832, 425 
N.E.2d at 1385. 
The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed. 
It held that the state had waived the argument 
that the search was incident to a valid custo-
dial arrest by failing to raise it at the sup-
pression hearing. Id. The court went on to 
state that "the stationhouse search of the 
shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search 
incident to a lawful arrest." 99 Ill. App.3d 
at 833, 425 N.E.2d at 1885. 
The Court of Appeals also held that the 
search was not a valid inventory of respon-
I 
- 5 
dent's belongings. It purported to distin-
guish South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 364 
-
(1976), finding (1) that there is a greater 
privacy interest in a purse-like shoulder bag 
----------~----- -----
than in a car, and (2) that the State's le-
gitimate interests could have been met in a 
less intrusive manner, by "sealing [the shoul-
der bag] within a platic bag or box and plac-
ing it in a secured locker." 99 Ill. App.3d 
at 834-35, 425 N.E.2d at 1386. Presumably, 
that court concluded that after sealing the 
bag a warrant should have been obtained. We 
disagree. 
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 
364 (1976), we upheld a search of the contents 
fully impounded by the police. We recognized 
(· that inventory searches serve three legitimate 
~- .- {)-
_ ....,~~~· 
purpose~o protect the owner's property 
(Ej 
while in the custody of the police, to protect 
the police against false claims of theft, and 
~ 
to protect the police from potential harm. 
Id. at 369. Accordingly, we held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit routine 
inventory searches of automobiles lawfully in 
police custody. 
Of course, there are limits on inven-
tory searches, which remain subject to the 
Fourth Amendment's bar on "unreasonable" 
searches. What is reasonable must be deter-
mined from all the facts and circumstances. 
It would be "unreasonable" to carry out an 
investigative search under the pretext of con-
ducting a routine inventory search, United 
States v. Diggs, 544 F. 2d 116, 125-27 (CA3 
1976) (Gibbons,~·, concurring): State v. 
- 7 -
Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484, 486 (Utah 1980), or to 
conduct a more intrusive search than is neces-
sary to protect the property and themselves. 
Here, the police routinely inventoried 
respondent's possessions after a routine ar-
rest for disorderly conduct. They did not 
suspect they would find contraband. Respon-
dent does not claim that the inventory was a 
pretext; on the contrary, he concedes that the 
7 
police merely sought to protect themselves 
from false claims and respondent's property 
from theft or damage. Br. for Resp. in Opp. 
6. Thus, the only question is whether the 
search was more intrusive than needed. 
In Opperman, we rejected the claim that 
the car should have been locked and placed 
under guard to protect it and its contents. 
Although separately inventorying and storing 
·. 
- ~ -
the car's contents entailed a greater intru-
sion into the owner's privacy, we held such a 
search permissible for three reasons. 
First, searching the car was the only 
way the police could adequa~ely protect them-
selves against the occasional danger that 
unsearched cars might present. As there is no 
way that police can tell whether or what class 
( 
of automobiles that come into their custody 
might contain dangerous instrumentalities, 
only routine searches can guarantee their 
safety. Second, inventories may help to dis-
courage false claims against the police. And 
third, there is "a · substantial gain in securi-
ty if automobiles are inventoiied and valuable 
items are removed for storage." Opperman, 428 
~ 
U.S. at 379 (Powell,~., concurring). The 
same reasons apply here to the police decision 
I I 
I r , 
~separatelyzinventory the contents of re-
spondent's bag rather than to seal and secure 
the bag as a s~. 
First, any items that are brought with-
in the confines of a police station, however 
innocent in appearance, might contain danger-
ous instrumentalities. The need to protect 
against such risks does not turn on the pres-
ence or absence of an actual fear that a par-
(~ c:. 
ticular package is dangerous. Second, absent 
a detailed inventory, the police would still 
be subject to claims that "someone" entered 
the sealed locker and removed valuable items 
from the bag. Third, the very existence of an 
inventory list may deter police employees from 
stealing goods in police custody. Thus, it 
was not "unreasonable" for the police to in-
ventory the contents of respondent's shoulder 
bag. 
Respondent's reliance on United States 
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1976), is misplaced. 
In Chadwick, the FBI arrested the respondent 
as he entered a car outside the Boston train 
station. At the same time, they also seized a 
large, locked footlocker that respondent had - - - ~ 
( . 
just placed in the car. Unlike this case, the i 
had abundant probable cause to believe the 
footlocker contained contraband. We held that 
the subsequent warrantless search of the dou-
ble locked footlocker in the Federal Building 
violated the Fourth Amendment, rejecting the 
government's claim that the search fell within 
the "automobile" or "search incident to ar-
rest" exceptions. The government did not 
claim that the search was a routine inventory 
search, 1 and indeed could not have done so 
since the purpose of the search was to confirm 
strong suspicion that the footlocker contained 
drugs. 
We conclude that police may routinely 
inventory the contents of containers in the 
possession of a person lawfully arrested. 2 
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and 
respondent's motion to proceed in forma paupe-
ris are granted, the judgment of the Illinois 
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
1 Indeed, we specifically noted that our analysis did not apply 
to inventory searches under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 
364 (1976). See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 n.S 
~1977). 
We do not address the issue whether the police could search 
the bag as a delayed search incident to respondent's arrest in 
view of the holding below that the state waived this issue by 
failing to raise it in the suppression hearing. See Wainright v. 
Sykes, 433 u.s. 72, 86-87 (1977). 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
..§n.prtntt <!fon:rt cf Ur~ ~b .;§btftlf 
._.as!pnght14 ~. Of. 2!T,?J!.~ 
JL.e~~~ 
~ 
October 28, 1982 ~ l..eJ 
RE: No. 81-1859, Illinois v. Lafayette ~ 




I enclose, only to those who exhibited some view 
that this case was wrongly decided, a draft Per Curiam 
reversing summarily. 
In Judge Wilbur Miller's terms, I don't "feel 
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Illinois v. Lafayette 
Questions Presented 
April 18, 1983 
Whether the police, acting pursuant to standard procedures, 





At 10:00 p.m. resp was arrested in a movie theater in Kanka-
kee, Illinois, for disturbing the peace. He had a shoulner bag 
(purse) strapped over his shoulder. The arresting officer did 
not search resp or seize the purse, but handcuffed him and took 
him to the police station. In the booking room the officer re-
moved the handcuffs and told resp to take everything from his 
pockets and place them on the counter. Resp did so. He also 
removed a pack of cigarettes from the purse and then placed the 
purse on the counter. The officer opened the purse and found ten 
pills wrapped in cellophane. The pills contained amphetamine, 
and resp subsequently was indicted for unlawful possession. 
The trial court suppressed the pills seized from the purse. 
The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed. .First, 
the court held that the State had waived its argument that the 
search was justified as a delayed search incident to a lawful 
arrest. But then the court held, n.ssuming arguendo that the 
State had not waived the argument, that the search would not be 
justified as a nelayed search incident to arrest. .Finally, the 
court held that the search could not be justified as an inventory 
search. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review. 
This Court granted cert following the Chief's unsuccessful 
attempt to get a Court for a summary reversal. The United States 
has filed a brief in support of petr, as has the Americans for 
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. (joined by several police organi-
zations). The California State Public Defender has filed a brief 
in support of resp. 
3. 
II. Discussion 
Petr seeks to justify the search here as either ( i) a de-
layed search incident to arrest, 0: ( ii) an inventory search. I 
find the search incident question very close, but believe the 
issue is not properly before the Court. If the Court does reach 
the issue, I would hold that the search incident rationale does 
not extend beyond the immediate post-arrest situation to the po-
lice station. I also believe that the search in this case is not 
justified on an inventory theory. I therefore recommend affirm-
ance. 
A 
1. The first question on the 






stated: "[W]e find the State has waived this argument for the 
purposes of appeal by failing to raise it at the suppression 
hearing." (Pet. App. at 3a.) But the Illinois court also stated 
that "even assuming, arguendo, that the State had not waived this 
argument, the stationhouse search of the shoulder bag did not 
constitute a valid search incident to a lawful arrest." ( Id.) 
And the court then conducted a detailed discussion of this issue 
-- a discussion longer than its discussion of the "inventory 
search" question. The Illinois court concluded its opinion with 
this statement: "Therefore, the postponed warrantless search of 
the defendant's shoulder bag was neither incident to his lawful 
arrest nor a valid inventory of his belongings, and thus, violat-
ed the fourth amendment. Accordingly, we affirm .... " (Id., at 
4. 
6a-7a.} 
I think it clear that the court's "waiver" holding consti-
tutes an i~~"adequate state ground of Petr 
argues that because the s a e cour ac e an the 
issue, this Court may consider it. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 
U.S. 153, 157 (1974}: Raley v. Ohio, 360 u.s. 423, 436 (1959}. 
In those cases, however, the situation was that the state court 
had decided an issue that arguably had not been raised: in nei-
ther case did the state court expressly hold that the argument 
had been waived. It troubles me that the state court issued an 
advisory opinion on this issue, but the fact remains that if this 
Court were to reverse on a "search incident" theory, on remand 
the Illinois court would be free to reinstate its judgment on the 
basis of its waiver holding. 
Petr also argues that Illinois's waiver rule is based on 
Steagald v. United States, 451 u.s. 204 (1981}, and therefore 
that this Court may review the question whether the issue was 
waived. (Petr then argues that it actually did raise the search 
incident issue in a post-suppress ion hearing memorandum filed 
prior to the trial court's decision.} I reject petr's position. J 
A state's waiver rule, even if based on a federal standard, is 
state law and is not subject to review in this Court. 
2. I turn to the merits of the search incident question, for 
your consideration in the event you disagree with my analysis of 
the waiver issue. (The search incident cases also are useful 
background in this area.} The f ctr ine of search inciden~ _!J a 
lawful arrest is based on the need to protect arresting officers 
5. 
from nearby weapons and to prevent the concealment or destruction 
/,' 
of evidence. See b himel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In 
/united States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), the Court ~£/L 
upheld a search of a cigarette pack in the arrestee's pocket even 
though the police lacked probable cause: "A custodial arrest of 
a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under 
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search inci-
dent to the arrest requires no additional justification." In New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court reaffirmed the 
rule, and noted that it permits searches of all containers within 
the arrestee's immediate control. 
In view of this precedent, it is clear -- and resp concedes 
that the police could have searched this shoulder bag at the 
(~im The question then becomes whether this basis 
for the search remains when the of~r reaches the station. An 
affirmative answer is provided in United States v. Edwards, 415 
u.s. 800 (1974). In that case the Court upheld a warrantless 
seizure and search of an arrestee's clothing. JUSTICE WHITE Is 
opinion for the Court (which you joined) noted that the police 
had authority to take the clothes into custody, and stated that 
"[t] he pol ice were also entitled to take from Edwards any evi- l 
dence of the crime in his immediate possess ion, including his 
clothing." Id., at 804-805. More to the point for this case, 
the Court said flatly: "It is ... plain that searches and sei-
zures that could be made on the spot at the time of the arrest 
may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the 
place of detention." 415 u.s., at 803. The rationale was that 
_AAJ w- .. ~~~(~ 
..A fJ ~ w s fY vv ~ ~l''::!~ 
.,. l tL .:5- . J . ;:----  ' . 
the accused "was no mo e imposed upon than he couln have been at 
the time and place of t 
Under ~theory, 
1.9..., at 805. 
it would seem that the search of resp's 
purse was lawful. The police did no more than they could have at 
th~he arrest. An opposite result is suggested, howev-
er, by United States v. Chaowick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977), whi\'h 
validated a warrantless search, at the police station, 
double-locked footlocker. The Chief's opinion (which you i 
distinguished the "search incident" cases in language that 
appear to apply fully to this case: 
"[W] arrantless searches of luggage or other 
property seized at the time of an arrest can-
not be iustified as incident to that arrest 
either if the 'search is remote in time or 
place from the a'rre'sl:,' or no exigency 
exists. Once law enforcement officers have 
reduceo luggage or other personal property not 
i~mediately ass~ciated w~h the person of the 
arrestee to the1r exclusive control, and there 
is no longer any aanger tha£ the arrestee 
might gain access to the property to seize a 
weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that 
property is no longer an incident of the ar-
n~st." 433 u.s., at 15. 
Under this approach, it is not true that the police may do at the 
stationhouse whatever they might have 0.one at the scene; rather, 
once the particular interests that justify a search incident to 
arrest have vanished, a warrant (or some other rationale) is nee-
essary for the search. 
The € ~__E!..s ..!£ rec~nc§ these passages from Chadwick 
and Edwards. He relies on a distinction derived from the Chief's 
use of the phrase "luggage or other personal property not immedi-
ately associated with the person of the arrestee." Under this 
theory, he suggests that the search incident rationale continues 
' ' 
7. 
beyond the immediate post-arrest situation whenever the item is 
something or~inarily "carried on the person of an individual or 
kept within ready access at all times." Brief for SG at 17. 
There is some intuitive force to this position: a purse seems 
more like a person's pockets (which surely can be searched at the 
~ 
pol ice stat ion) than 1 ike a Clouble-lockec1 2 00-pouna footlocker 
(which cannot be searched) . But adherence to this view would 
produce the same problems associated with the "unworthy contain-
er" test in the car search cases. If a purse is "immediately 
associated with the person," is the same true of a suitcase that 
he is carrying? What about a briefcase? a shopping bag? four 
shopping bags? In short, the 1 ine-dr awing problems would be as 
difficult -- and as confusing to police -- as those in the car 
search cases. Having iust decided to avoid these problems by 
adopting a bright-line test in United States v. Ross, u.s. -- --
(1982), the Court probably shouln do so in this context as well. 
I therefore think that, if the search incident issue proper-~ 
ly were here, the Court would have to choose between the Edwards~ 
. t.d-' 
and Chadwick rationales. Following Edwards, the Court could hol~
that the police are entitled to conduct a stationhouse search to dL 
the same extent as they are entitled to conduct a contemporaneo~ 
- __. 
search incident to arrest. Following Chadwick, the Court could 
hold that the primary basis of a search incident to arrest -- the 
exigencies of the situation -- has c1isappearec1 by the time the 
arrestee and his belongings arrive at the police station, and 
therefore any search conducted there must be pursuant to a war-




an easy choice, because I believe there is some force in Edwards' 
reasoning that if the police could search the shoulder bag at the 
scene, there is little reason to find that the police cannot con-
duct the same search at the station. But I conclude that the 
~ 
rationale of a contemporaneous search incident to arrest simply 
does not apply to a stationhouse search of a purse. By the time 
the police reach the stationhouse, the purse should be suffi-
ciently secured so that the suspect cannot reach it to obtain a 
weapon or to destroy or conceal evidence. (In fact, this was not 
true here, but I would think that by permitting the arrestee to 
retain the shoulder bag on the trip to the station, the officer 
indicated his belief that there was no danger to himself or to 
possible evidence.) The search at the station, therefore, is not 
like a contemporaneous search incident to arrest. Whatever 
search may be conducted "incident to booking" Rhould be deter-
mined by reference to the particular interests of the police in 
security at the station. 
B 
1. The issue that is before the 




The leading case ~ 
is South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 364 (1976), in which the 
Court upheld a routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded 
automobile. The Court's opinion placed partial emphasis on the 
fact that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car. 
It also noted that the police were operating pursuant to a stand-
ard procedure that served three interests: (i) protection of the 
9. 
owner's property, (ii) protection of the police from claims con-
cerning lost or stolen property, anQ (iii) protection of the po-
lice from potential danger. 428 U.S., at 369. The Court held 
that these routine administrative searches did not require a war-
rant, for the concept of probable cause did not apply to these 
noninvestigative searches. 
You joined the Chief's opinion, but also wrote a concurring 
opinion stating that the decision "provides no general license 
for the police to examine all the contents of such automobiles." 
Id., at 380. You emphasized that the police operated pursuant to 
departmental regulations and without discretion; that the police 
had not searched the locked trunk, and that there was no evidence 
in the record that the police had examined the contents of the 
items seized other than so far as necessary to inventory them and 
remove them for storage. ~ 
2. The application of Opperman to this case is not simple.~ 
To the extent Opperman turned on the reduced expectation of pri-
vacy in an automobile -- particularly in an abandoned automobile 
-- the decision does not apply to a stationhouse search of the 
contents of a purse or other container. On the other hand, the 
rationales of Opperman are not limited to the car situation. It 
therefore is necessary to consider how they apply here: ~ 
e ro _teet io~ 0 f the own::,' S pr o'?._e r ty -- ThiS rationale ~f.tt..­
seems to provine little reason to search and inventory every 
piece of property found in an arrestee's purse. The entire bag 
could be locked up in one piece, without being open eo, and it 
would be as safe as if the bag were searched, inventoried, ann 
10. 
then locked up. 
(ii) Protection of police from false claims -- As vou sug-
gested in Opperman, this rationale has limite~ force. It proba-
bly is true that a detailed inventory will minimize false claims, 
but it is possible that some owners will assert that property was 
omitted from the inventory. 
(iii) Protection of police from nanger -- In my view, your 
rationale in Opperman applies equally here: "Except in rare 
cases, there is 1 i ttle danger associ a ted with impouncHng 
unsearched automobiles. But the occasional danger that may exist 
cannot be discounted entirely. The harmful consequences in those 
rare cases may be great, and there does not appear to be any ef-
fective way of identifying in advance those circumstances or 
classes of automobile impoundments which represent a greater 
risk." 428 u.s., at 378. For example, there may be some danger 
to police when, upon the person's release from jail, they return 
an unsearched purse that might contain a weapon. 
It therefore appears that the justifications for an inven-
tory search do extend to the police station. The countervailing 
privacy interests, however, seem greater than in Opperman: the 
expectation of privacy in personal effects is greater than in an 
abandoned automobile. You were concerned, moreover, that any ""S 
such search be 1 imi ted and conducted pursuant to regulations. c 
Under this rationale, it is not clear that the "standard proce-
dures" followed in the Kankakee police station are sufficiently 
delineated or routine. The arresting officer testified that when 
he arrests a person with a purse, he routinely examines the con-
11. 
tents. He also said that he looke~ in the purse because "every-
thing has to be inventoried." App. 15. But there was no testi-
mony that the Kankakee police department haa any regulations to 
this effect or that it otherwise instructed the officer on how to 
proceed. For example, we are not informed as to whether the po-
lice routinely open an<'! inventory locked containers brought in 
with the arrestee. Nor are we tolo when an officer decides his 
inventory is sufficiently detailed -- for example, floes he go 
inside a zippered compartment in the purse? does he open any 
container found in the zippered compartment? does he open any-
thing found in the container? In sum, the officer 1 s testimony 
that "a search at the time of booking" is "a normal proceflure" is 
not particularly helpful. App. 12. 
It seems fair to conclude that the Kankakee police search 
everything on the arrestee 1 s possession. I do not believe the 
Court should adopt a broad rule permitting the police to inven-
tory everything lawfully in their custody. If an inventory 
search is permissible in all situations, then the Fourth Amena-
ment effectively does not apply once a person is arrested. This 
would undercut much prior case law. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
u.s. 753 (1979), for example, the Court invalidated a warrantless 
search of an unlocked sui tease. Under the broadest inventory 
theory, the police could inventory the suitcase once at the sta-
tion. Indeed, under a broad inventory theory, the police could 
examine and inventory the contents of the locked trunk at issue 
in Chadwick. 
If the police cannot inventory every piece of property that 
12. 
/ comes into the station, the difficult question arises again as to 
where to draw the line. It appears to me that the effect of for- ( 
bidding an inventory search in all cases is to forbid it in al- \ 
most ~case. If an inventory search is not permissible for an 
unlocked suitcase (as was involved in San~ers) , there would be no 
justification for permitting it with respect to resp's unlocked 
"shoulder bag." The exception would he that the police of course 
may seize and inventory all items from the arrestee's person and 
clothing. This is essential for security if the person is to be 
detained at the station. But this rationale would support only 
seizure of these items. Once seized, any such property would be 
like the sui tease in Sanders or the luggage in Chadwick: the 
police have lawful custody of it, but may not search it without a 
warrant. 
3. The SG adds an additional consideration. When an arrest-
ee is taken into custody, it is reasonable for the police to de-
termine his identification. Suppose he refuses to identify him-
self or gives a name the police think may be false, or the police 
simply want his driver's license to aid their booking. Are they 
prohibited from opening his purse or other container that may 
contain such identification? Must they allow the arrestee him-
self to extract from the closed container the relevant pieces of 
identification, without first making sure that the container has 
no weapon that may be used against them? I am sympathetic to the 
SG's point that "it is entirely reasonable, as part of the admin-
istrative booking procedure, to inspect the contents of an 
arrestee's wallet or purse in order to ascertain or verify the 
•'' 
13. 
identity of the person being incarcerated." Brief for SG at 19. 
The booking procedure should not become complex or in any sense a 
"game" in which the officers try to discover the identity of the 
arrestee. 
If the Court held that the police could search a wallet or 
purse for identification, some line-drawing problems would re-
main. This case is a good example. Resp describes the searched 
item as a "shoulder bag" that resembles luggage: petr describes 
it as a "purse" that is functionally equivalent to a wallet. 
(The record is not developed on this point, though my guess is 
that it is more like a purse than a suitcase.) It therefore is 
not clear if the police would have had cause to look for identi-
fication in this bag. 
Because the State 0id not raise this issue, but rather has 
sought to defend only on the need to inventory the items in the 
purse, the Court need not reach the question of looking for iden-
tification. I have raised the point because I think it is one 
that should be considered when one is trying to figure out exact-
ly what the police should be entitled to do when booking an 
arrestee. 
4. I am not entirely comfortable with the result reached 
herein, for I think that rejection of petr 's argument may well 
result in a major change in police practice. The brief for the 
law enforcement amici points out that Professor LaFave's treatise 
states: 
"Currently, such evidence [resulting from rou-
tine booking searches] is admissible, and this 
is generally so even when the inventory has 
been most thorough. It is customary for the 
booking inventory to involve an i tem-by-i tern 
examination of everything in the arrestee 1 s 
pockets or otherwise on his person, including 
looking into his wallet or into containers on 
the perso~ even extend to a strip 
search." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
§5.3 (1978). 
14. 
And in previous cases the Court has found historical practice to 
be relevant. For example, in Edwards JUSTICE WHITE observec'l: 
"Historical evidence points to the established and routine custom 
of permitting a iailor to search a person who is being processe~ 
for confinement under his custody and control. While 1 [a] rule 
of practice must not be allowed ••• to prevail over a constitu-
tional right, 1 little doubt has ever been expressed about the 
validity or reasonableness of such searches incident to incarcer-
ation." 415 U • S • , at 8 0 4 n • 6 ( c i tat ions om i t ted) • Nonetheless, 
I do not think that the rationales in Opperman should permit a 
warrantless search of every piece of property lawfully seized by 
the police. 
I I I. Conclusion 
I recommend affirmance on the ground that the police may not 
routinely search and inventory every piece of property that the 
arrestee brings with him to the police station. Other possible 
justifications for the search are not before the Court. The "de-
layed search incident" argument was waived, and the State has not 
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Re: 81-1859 - Illinois v. Lafayette 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Ju.prtmt <lfourt qf tlft ~tb .ftms 
... ufrington. ~. <If. 2llgtll-~ 
June 1, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1859 Illinois v. Lafayette 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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~uputtt.r <!fllltti llf tlft 'J!tnit.tb ;§taft.&' 
:.lnl'ltittgton. ~. <!f. 206!)!.~ 
June 6, 1983 
Re: 81-1859 - Illinois v. Lafayette 
Dear Chief: 
As I read the holding on page 9 of your opinion, 
it would apply to a case in which a person was stopped 
for a traffic offense and was taken to the station to 
be booked because he was not carrying his driver's 
license. I wonder if you intend the holding to apply 
to every booking, or merely to those that precede the 
actual incarceration of the arrested person. 
Perhaps it is necessary to write the opinion that 
broadly because it is probably somewhat doubtful that 
this respondent would have actually been kept in jail 
on a disturbing the peace charge but, at least for the 
moment, I am inclined to think the opinion is somewhat 
broader than I will be able to join. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§upuuu <.!Jomi cf lift> 'Jltni:Ub' .;§hdeg 
.. ru¥.£rington. ~. OJ. 2.0.;7'1~ 
June 6, 1983 
Re: 81-1859 - Illinois v. Lafayette 
Dear Chief: 
As I read the holding on page 9 of your opinion, 
it would apply to a case in which a person was stopped 
for a traffic offense and was taken to the station to 
be booked because he was not carrying his driver's 
license. I wonder if you intend the holding to apply 
to every booking, or merely to those that precede the 
actual incarceration of the arrested person. 
Perhaps it is necessary to write the opinion that 
broadly because it is probably somewhat doubtful that 
this respondent would have actually been kept in jail 
on a disturbing the peace charge but, at least for the 
moment, I am inclined to think the opinion is somewhat 
broader than I will be able to join. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHA M BERS OF 
.JU ST I CE SA N D RA DAY O'C ONNOR 
No. 
Dear Chief, 
.§n.prtmt CI;.ourt of t~t 1tnitth .§taft,s' 
'21Ia.."ftington, ~· <q. 2D,?.ll-~ 
June 7, 1983 
81-1859 Illinois v. 
It was my understanding from the Conference that a 
majority thought the State had waived the search incident to 
an arrest argument and that we would decide the case on the 
inventory search basis. I was surprised to see the reliance 
on the search incident to arrest cases on pp. 4-5 inasmuch 
as the opinion appears to finally be based on an inventory 
search. 
I am not yet reconciled to an abandonment of the 
approach Potter had taken of requiring a warrant unless the 
search falls within a recognized exception. Having been a 
trial judge, and having conducted many judges training 
programs, I can tell you firsthand that most judges 
understand the "warrant exception" approach better than an 
approach based solely on a "reasonable search" basis. I 
prefer to move very cautiously away from our precedents in 
this area. 
I suggest that the first full paragraph of Part II 
on pp. 3 & 4 be revised to read substantially as follows: 
"The question here is whether, 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the police 
may search the personal effects of a person under 
lawful arrest as part of the routine 
administrative procedure at a police stationhouse 
incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The 
justification for such searches does not rest on 
the existence of probable cause. Indeed, we have 
previously established that the inventory search 
constitutes a well-defined exception to the 
warrant requir ement. See South Dakota v. 
Opperman, supra. The Illinois court and 
respondent rely on United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
753 (1979); in the former, we noted that 'probable 
·-
cause to search is irrelevant' in inventory 
searches and went on to state: 
'This is so because the 
salutary functions of a warrant simply 
have no application in that context; the 
constitutional reasonableness of 
inventory searches must be determined on 
other bases.' Id., at 10 n.S.lJ 
To determine whether the search of respondent's 
shoulder bag was unreasonable we must 'balance[e] 
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.' Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 654 (1979); cf. South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S., at 367-369 (referring to 
individual's diminished expectation of privacy in 
automobile and legitimate state interests served 
by inventory); id., at 378-380, 382-384 (POWELL, 
J., concurring)~ 
2. 
Finally, I think we should adhere to the Opperman 
requirement that inventory searches be conducted in 
accordance with established administrative rules or 
procedures. Perhaps you could add a footnote following the 
first sentence on page 8 as follows: 
"[I]t is not our function to write a manual on 
administering routine, neutral procedures at the 
sta tionhouse .lJ 
lJ We do emphasize, however, that it must appear that 
the search in question was "conducted in accordance 
with established police department rules or policy" and 
that the search was part of the routine administrative 
procedure, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S., at 383 
(POWELL, J., concurring), if the authorities attempt to 
justify the stationhouse search as an inventory 
search." 
Sincerely, 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1859 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. RALPH LAFAYETTE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF 
ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT 
[June-, 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question presented is whether, at the time an arrested 
person arrives at a police station, the police may, without ob-
taining a warrant, search a shoulder bag carried by that 
person. 
I 
On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p.m., Officer Maurice 
Mietzner of the Kankakee City Police arrived at the Town 
Cinema 111 Kankakee, Illinois, in response to a call about a 
disturbance. There he found respondent involved in an 
altercation with the theatre manager. He arrested respond-
ent for disturbing the peace, handcuffed him, and took him to 
the police station. Respondent carried a purse-type shoul-
der bag on the trip to the station. 
At the police station respondent was taken to the booking 
room; there, Officer Mietzner removed the handcuffs from re-
spondent and ordered him to empty his pockets and place the 
contents on the counter. After doing so, respondent took a 
package of cigarettes from his shoulder bag and placed the 
bag on the counter. Mietzner then removed the contents of 
the bag, and found ten amphetamine pills inside a cigarette 
case package. { f>"-''.i ~Si!M 
Respondent was subsequently charged with violating Sec-
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tion 1402(b) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Ill. 
Rev. Stat., ch. 56 112, ~ 1402(b), on the basis of the controlled 
substances found in his shoulder bag. A pretrial suppression 
hearing was held at which the State argued that the search of 
the shoulder bag was a valid inventory search under South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). Officer 
Mietzner testified that he examined the bag's contents be-
cause it was standard procedure to inventory "everything" in 
the possession of an arrested person. App. 15, 16. He tes-
tified that he was not seeking and did not expect to find drugs 
or weapons when he searched the bag and he conceded that 
the shoulder bag was small enough that it could have been 
placed and sealed in a bag, container or locker for protective 
purposes. !d., at 15. After the hearing, but before any rul-
ing, the State submitted a brief in which it argued for the 
first time that the search was valid as a delayed search inci-
dent to arrest. Thereafter, the trial court ordered the sup-
pression of the amphetamine pills. I d., at 22. 
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. 99 Ill. 
App. 3d 830, 425 N. E. 2d 1383 (3d Dist. 1981). It first held 
that the State had waived the argument that the search was 
incident to a valid arrest by failing to raise that argument at 
the suppression hearing. !d., at 832, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1385. 
However, the court went on to discuss and reject the State's 
argument: "[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the State has 
not waived this argument, the stationhouse search of the 
shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search incident to a 
lawful arrest." !d., at 833, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1385. 
The State court also held that the search was not a valid 
inventory of respondent's belongings. It purported to dis-
tinguish South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, on the basis that 
there is a greater privacy intere t in a purse-type shoulder 
bag than in an automobile, and that the State's legitmate in-
terests could have been met in a less intrusive manner, by 
"sealing [the shoulder bag] within a plastic bag or box and 
placing it in a secured locker." 99 Ill. App. 3d, at 834-835, 
425 N. E. 2d, at 1386. The Illinois court concluded: 
81-1859-0PINION 
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"Therefore, the postponed warantless search of the [re-
spondent's] shoulder bag was neither incident to his law-
ful arrest nor a valid inventory of his belongings, and 
thus, violated the fourth amendment." !d., at 835, 425 
N. E. 2d, at 1386. 
The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. B-1. We granted certiorari, --
U. S. -- (1982), because of the frequency with which this 
question confronts police and courts, and we reverse. 
II 
The question here is whether, consistent with the Fourth \ 
Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal 
effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine 
administrative procedure at a police stationhouse incident to 
booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such 
searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the ab-
sence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the 
search. Indeed, we have previously established that the in-
ventory search constitutes a well-defined exception to the 
warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 
supra. The Illinois court and respondent rely on United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), and Arkansa v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); in the former, we noted that 
"probable cause to search is irrelevant" in inventory searches 
and went on to state: 
"This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant 
simply have no application in that context; the constitu-
tional reasonableness of inventory searches must be de-
termined on other bases." I d., at 10 n. 5. 1 
'See also United States v. Edwm·ds, 415 U. S. 800 (1974). In that case 
we addressed Cooper v. Cal(f'omia, 386 U. S. 58 (1967), where the Court 
sustained a warrantless search of an automobile that occurred a week after 
its owner had been arrested. We explained Coope1· in the following man-
ner: "It was no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search 
warrant, for the Court held the test to be, not whether it was reasonable to 
81-1859---0PINION 
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A so-called inventory search is not an independent legal con-
cept but rather an incidental administrative step following ar-
rest and preceding incarceration. To determine whether the \ 
search of respondent's shoulder bag was unreasonable we 
must "balanc[e] its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. 8. 
648, 654 (1979). 
In order to see an inventory search in proper perspective, 
it is necessary to study the evolution of interests along the 
continuum from arrest to incarceration. We have held that 
immediately upon arrest an officer may lawfully search the 
person of an arrestee , United States v. Robinson, 414 U. 8. 
218 (1973); he may also search the area within the arestee's 
immediate control, Chim el v. California, 395 U. 8. 752 
(1969). We explained the basis for this doctrine in United 
States v. Robinson, supra, where we said: 
"A police officer's determination as to how and where to 
search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is 
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth 
Amendment does not require to be broken down in each 
instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The 
authority to search the person incident to a lawful custo-
dial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to 
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may 
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest 
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be 
found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial ar-
rest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion 
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification. It is the fact of the lawf ul arrest 
procure a search warrant , but whether the search itse!f'H•as reasonable, 
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which establishes the authority to search, and we hold 
that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search 
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'rea-
sonable' search under that Amendment." 414 U. S., at 
235 (emphasis added). /~,'S$IOY\ 
An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police sta-
tion or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station, 
that is no more than a continuation of the custody inherent in 
the arrest status. Nonetheless, the factors justifying a 
search of the person and personal effects of an arrestee upon 
reaching a police station but prior to being placed in confine-
ment are somewhat different from the factors justifying an 
immediate search at the time and place of arrest. 
The governmental interests underlying a stationhouse 
search of the arrestee's person and possessions may in some 
circumstances be even greater than those supporting a 
search immediately following arrest. Consequently, the 
scope of a stationhouse search will often vary from that made 
at the time of arrest. Police conduct that would be impracti-
cal or unreasonable-or embarrasingly intrusive-on the 
street can more readily-and privately-be performed at the 
station. For example, the interests supporting a search inci-
dent to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on 
the street, but the practical necessities of routine jail admin-
istration may even justify taking a prisoner's clothes before 
confining him, although that step would be rare. This was 
made clear in United States v. Edwards, supra, 415 U. S., at 
804: "With or without probable cause, the authorities were 
entitled [at the stationhouse] not only to search [the arrest-
ee's] clothing but also to take it from him and keep it in offi-
cial custody." 2 
' We were not addressing in Edww·ds, and do not discuss here, the cir-
cumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be 
appropriate. 
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At the stationhouse, it is entirely proper for police to re-
move and list or inventory property found on the person or in 
the possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed. A t 
range of governmental interests support an inventory proc-
ess. It is not unheard of for persons employed in police ac-
tivities to steal property taken from arrested persons; simi-
larly, arrested persons have been known to make false claims 
regarding what was taken from their possession at the 
stationhouse. A standardized procedure for making a list or / 
inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the 
stationhouse not only deters false claims but also inhibits 
theft or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested 
person. Arrested persons have also been known to injure 
themselves-or others-with belts, knives, drugs or other 
items on their person while being detained. Dangerous in-
strumentalities-such as razor blades, bombs, or weapons-
can be concealed in innocent-looking articles taken from the 
arrestee's possession. The bare recital of these mundane re-
alities justifies reasonable measures by police to limit these 
risks-either while the items are in police possession or at 
the time they are returned to the arrestee upon his release. 
Examining all the items removed from the arrestee's person 
or possession and listing or inventorying them is an entirely 
reaonable administrative procedure. It is immaterial 
whether the police actually fear any particular package or 
container; the need to protect against such risks arises inde-
pendent of a particular officer's subjective concerns. See 
United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 U. S., at 235. Fi-
nally, inspection of an arrestee's personal property may as-
sist the police in ascertaining or verifying his identity. See 2 
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3, at 306--307 (1978). In 
short, every consideration of orderly police administration 
benefiting both police and the public points toward the appro-
priateness of the examination of respondent's shoulder bag I 
prior to his incarceration. 
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Our prior cases amply support this conclusion. In South 
Dakota v. Opperman, supra, we upheld a search of the con-
tents of the glove compartment of an abandoned automobile 
lawfully impounded by the police. We held that the search 
was reasonable because it served legitimate governmental in-
terests that outweighed the individual's privacy interests in 
the contents of his car. Those measures protected the own-
er's property while it was in the custody of the police and pro-
tected police against possible false claims of theft. We found 
no need to consider the existence of less intrusive means of 
protecting the police and the property in their custody-such 
as locking the car and impounding it in safe storage under 
guard. Similarly, standardized inventory procedures are I 
appropriate to serve legitimate governmental interests at 
stake here. 
The Illinois court held that the search of respondent's 
shoulder bag was unreasonable because "preservation of the 
defendant's property and protection of police from claims of 
lost or stolen property 'could have been achieved in a less in-
trusive manner.' For example, ... the defendant's shoulder 
bag could easily have been secured by sealing it within a plas-
tic bag or box and placing it in a locker." 99 Ill. App. 3d, at 
835, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1386 (citation omitted). Perhaps so, 
but the real question is not what "could have been achieved," 
but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps; it is 
not our function to write a manual on administering routine, 
neutral procedures of the stationhouse. Our role is to assure 
against violations of the Constitution. 
The reasonableness of any particular governmental activ-
ity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of 
alternative "less intrusive" means. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413 U. S. 433 (1973), for example, we upheld the search of 
the trunk of a car to find a revolver suspected of being there. 
We rejected the contention that the public could equally well 
have been protected by the posting of a guard over the auto-
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mobile. In language equally applicable to this case, we held, 
"[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the ab-
stract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does 
not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." I d., at 44 7. 
See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 
557 n. 12 (1976). We are hardly in a position to second-guess 
police departments as to what practical administrative 
method will best deter theft by and false claims against its 
employees and preserve the security of the stationhouse. It 
is evident that a stationhouse search of every item carried on 
or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by 
the police will amply serve the important and legitimate gov-
ernmental interests involved. 
Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some 
particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to ex-
pect police officers in the everyday course of business to 
make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers 
or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit. 
Only recently in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), 
we stated: "'[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide 
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to 
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests in-
volved in the specific circumstances they confront.'" I d., at 
458-460, quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 
213-214 (1979). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 
798, 821 (1982). 
Applying these principles, we hold that it is not "unreason-
able" for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to 
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or 
article in his possession, in accordance with established in-
ventory procedures. 3 
The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed 
"The record is unclear as to whether respondent was to have been in-
carcerated after being booked for disturbing the peace. That is an appro-
priate inquiry on remancl. 
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and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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